Abstract-In order to integrate identity authentication and key agreement, a novel academic thought is set out, a fasting one-way accumulator is constructed, and a fasting one-way accumulator-based key management protocol is put forward for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks (HSNs). The experiments and analysis show that the proposed protocol not only implements identity authentication function, but has high connectivity and security, low energy consumption as well.
accumulator. Section 5 provides the protocol. Section 6 gives the experiment and analysis. Section 7 concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Eschenauer and Gligor [3] first proposed a probabilistic pre-distribution scheme for key management in sensor networks. The main idea is that let each sensor node randomly pick up a set of keys from a key pool before deployment, so any pair of sensor nodes has a certain probability of sharing at least one common key. Liu [4] , et al., proposed a group-based deployment model to improve key pre-distribution. In this model, sensor nodes are only required to be deployed in groups. Feng [5] , et al., proposed a general key seeds management and assignment (KSMA) model to study the security of key pre-distribution schemes, which is used to study the security of key pre-distribution schemes with five attributes for requirement of confidentiality and authentication. In Ref. [6] , Du, et al., proposed a routing-driven key management protocol for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks, which only establishes shared keys for neighbor sensors that communicate with each other. The routing-driven protocol utilizes Elliptic Curve Cryptography in the design of an efficient key management scheme for sensor nodes. Yao [7] , et al., put forward a broadcast authentication algorithm based on the properties of fasting one-way accumulator. Vaidya [8] , et al., proposed a user authentication protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks. Literatures [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] are all designed from the standpoint of random graph theory. All of them ignore the fact that all nodes belong to a set, so they have studied authentication key and communication key, separately. In this paper, we integrate them together.
Benaloh and Mare [11] presented one-way accumulator, which satisfies a quasi-commutative property that allows it to be used for membership testing. Nyberg [12] introduced a fasting accumulator, which can be efficiently realized in practice using existing cryptographic hash algorithms and pseudorandom sequence generators.
III. ACADEMIC THOUGHT
A typical HSN model consists of two physically different types of sensor nodes: powerful High-end sensors (H-sensors) and Low-end sensors (L-sensors) [9] . As shown in Fig. 1 , both H-sensors and L-sensors are uniformly and randomly distributed in the field. After deployment, clusters are formed in an HSN [10] . It is natural to let powerful H-sensors serve as cluster-heads (CH) and form clusters around them. All H-sensors form a backbone in the network. Each L-sensor sends data to its cluster head (an H-sensor) through one or more hops. Furthermore, an H-sensor aggregates data and transmits compressed data to the sink via the H-sensor backbone. So, the many-to-one communication pattern plays a dominant role in HSN. An L-sensor only needs to communicate with a small part of its neighbors, which are in the routes from itself to the sink. That is to say, an L-sensor does not need shared-keys with all neighbors [5] .
Let V represents nodes set (including H-sensors and L-sensors), E for edges (links) set, an HSN can be defined as follows: In this section, we will firstly introduce fasting one-way accumulator and its properties, and then construct a FOA.
A. FOA Properties
Fasting one-way accumulator [12] is a type of non-trapdoor one-way accumulator. It can accumulate all elements of the set to a value, and provides a witness for each element to demonstrate that the element is a part of the original hash [11] . It is commonly used to construct a membership testing system without the need for a trusted central authority.
A family of FOA is an infinite set of functions : 
h h x y y h h x y y  .
From the properties of the FOA, we can obtain the following theorems: Theorem 1. A fasting one-way accumulator :
Proof. Suppose a fasting one-way accumulator :
. By the properties of FOA, we assert that:
B. FOA Design
Different from traditional one-way accumulator, fasting one-way accumulator is constructed based on a common hash function. All operations are simple bit operations and can achieve rapidly accumulation. The constructor is as follows. Let 2 t N  be an upper bound to the number of items to be accumulated and let r be an integer. We assume that there is a one-way hash function H which maps bit strings of arbitrary length to bit strings of fixed length s rt  . Let 1 
B. Identity Authentication
After sensor deployment, clusters are formed in an HSN. The H-sensors serves as cluster-heads and the L-sensors play a part of cluster members. The details of clustering scheme can be found in Ref. [10] . If two sensors are in communication range, they attempt to establish session key. All legitimate nodes belong to the same set, but have no other relationship. To prevent malicious nodes, before the key agreement is established, nodes have to authenticate each other. Fig. 2 shows the specific process. 
C. Key Agreement
After discovering the neighbors, each L-sensor (say L i ) sends a Key-request message to its CH (as shown in Fig.  3 message 1) , which includes its ID, list of its neighboring nodes and a nonce. The message is encrypted by shred-key is k
. As CH is loaded with all shared keys, it decrypts the message and gets its neighbors. After a certain time, CH should receive Key-request messages from all (or most) L-sensors in its cluster. CH uses a centralized MST or SPT algorithm to determine the tree structure in the cluster [10] . Next, CH generates a shared-key (say by using is k , and unicasts the message to i. L-sensor i decrypts the message and obtain the shared key between itself and L-sensor j. After all L-sensors obtain the shared-keys, they can computer shard key : 
D. Adding New Nodes
After a long period, a portion of nodes will be captured or die of due to lack of energy. In order to maintain the normal operation, the network will deploy new L-sensors. These newly deployed sensor nodes need to establish secret keys with existing nodes. New node (L x ) is configured in according with section 5.1. After L x is deployed in the network, neighbor nodes authenticate its identity pursuant to section 5.2. If the node can't pass authentication, it is asserted to be malicious, and rejected to join the network. Otherwise, it will carry out key agreement accordance to section 5.3.
E. Nodes revocation
The unattended operation of sensors in hostile areas raises the real possibility of L-sensor exit. Whenever an L-sensor node is compromised, it is essential to be able to revoke the entire key ring of that node. Assume that the node compromise is detected by some protocol and reported to the cluster head CH. CH generates the revocation message containing the list of key identifiers to be revoked, and unicasts it to each node by encrypting it with a key is k . (Recall that CH is pre-loaded all of the shared-keys in key pre-distribution phase.) After obtaining the message, each node decrypts the list of key identifiers, locates those identifiers in its key ring, and removes the corresponding keys (if any).
VI. ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENT
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed key management protocol. The E-G protocol [3] is used for comparison. We compare the connectivity and energy consumption in subsection 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. The security analysis is presented in subsection 6.3.
A. Connectivity Analysis
Assume that the number of H-sensors and L-sensors in an HSN is M and N, respectively. Typically we have M<<N. FOA-based key management protocol establishes shared key through the key agreement. It is known from the section 4.3 that any two legitimate nodes in communication range can establish unique shared key through the exchange || || ID Data z . Thus, the connectivity 1850 JOURNAL OF COMPUTERS, VOL. 7, NO. 8, AUGUST 2012 probability of the proposed protocol is constant. However, in the E-G protocol, for H-sensors and L-sensors have the different storage capability, the number of keys they store is not equal. Assume that when the key pool is S, the number of keys in H-sensor and L-sensor is H and L ( HL  ), respectively. The probability ( LL p ) of between L-sensor at least one key is shared as follows:
The probability ( HL p ) of sharing at least one key between H-sensor and L-sensor is as following: 
It is shown in Fig. 4 that the connectivity probability of the proposed protocol is always 1. In E-G protocol, the relationship between LL p ( HL p ) and the combinations of S and L ( H ). While S is equal to 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100 respectively, L is equal to 3, 7, 9, and H is equal to 3, 8, 12, we get the probability of at least sharing one key. It can be seen that while H and L are unchanged, S becomes larger, and the probability is smaller. However, while S stays the same, and L (H) becomes bigger, the probability increases. 
B. Energy Consumption Analysis
We run simulations to compare the energy consumption of our protocol and the E-G protocol. The simulations are conducted by using the Omnet4.1 simulator. The simulation testbed has 1 sink, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 H-sensors, and corresponding 16, 35, 54, 73, 92 L-sensors randomly distributed in a 200*200m 2 area. The system parameters are set according to the MICA2 Mote datasheet [13] . We compare the total energy consumption under the proposed protocol and the E-G protocol in the same deployment. The energy consumption reported here only includes the energy used to set up security keys, but does not include energy for data communications.
As shown in Fig. 5 , the energy consumption of the proposed protocol is lower than the E-G protocol. The reason is that utilizing the many-to-one communication pattern can effectively lower the energy consumption in sensor networks. (1 2 (1 2 ) ) (1 (1 ) ) (1 ) 
